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SECURITY POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 
 
Over the course of the 2008 election, the idea of fundamental change became the 
dominant theme of American politics, and to some degree the capacity to 
undertake it was displayed in response to a crisis of confidence in financial 
markets. When the flow of credit necessary to support normal economic activity 
virtually ceased in the final quarter of the year, prevailing ideology was abandoned 
and long-established policies radically altered in feats of reaction that would have 
been considered inconceivable just a few days before they actually occurred. The 
initial actions taken did not master the problem, and the process of doing so will 
apparently be lengthy and torturous. Nonetheless the ability to redirect policy in 
response to calamity was demonstrated at a moment—the final weeks of a 
presidential election—when it normally would have been considered least likely to 
occur.  
The deeper question, however, is whether the United States political system can 
anticipate calamity before it occurs and undertake the fundamental redirection of 
policy necessary to avoid it. The financial crisis revealed that the leading 
institutions had been driven into unsustainable levels of debt by a misconception of 
risk that permeated the market. No one with direct responsibility noticed until the 
collapse occurred. A comparably significant misconception of risk lies at the core 
of prevailing security policy with yet greater potential for catastrophe. The risk 
results from operational practices of nuclear deterrent forces that are not assuredly 
safe or strategically justified but are deeply institutionalized. The underlying 
question is whether the United States can comprehend smoldering danger and 
adjust to changing circumstances that are ultimately more consequential but less 
immediately compelling than the financial crisis has been.  
The political system that faces this question has been rightly revered for its ability 
to protect individual rights and to prevent the abuse of power. Judged against 
absolute standards, its historical performance in that regard has hardly been 
flawless, and in fact the protection of disadvantaged constituencies remains among 
the more urgent problems of American society more than two centuries after the 
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constitutional design was enacted. Judged against the record of other forms of 
government, however, it can fairly claim preeminence given the size and diversity 
of the population it serves.  
That accomplishment is so seminal and its preservation is so vital that most 
Americans are extremely reluctant to acknowledge the price that has been paid. 
The United States political system, designed and painfully evolved to prevent 
tyranny, has grave difficulty formulating coherent policy that is responsive to 
common interest. Coordination of a deliberately divided and protectively restrained 
government depends on a degree of consensus that is difficult to achieve and even 
more difficult to change once it has been achieved. Provisions for protecting 
minority rights, moreover, make government policy highly susceptible to the self-
serving influence of interests that are economically privileged and intensely 
invested in a particular cause. Those features pose a question as to whether the 
American political system is capable of adapting to rapid and radical changes of 
circumstance that require the highly organized defense of common interests in 
terms that are different from established habits. Is it a magnificent dinosaur headed 
for extinction?  
One can reasonably hope that metaphor is overly dramatic, but the underlying issue 
is quite serious. Radical changes of circumstance, summarized in the term 
globalization, are widely acknowledged and ubiquitously discussed, but the ability 
to comprehend the implications let alone to manage them has not been 
demonstrated. The implosion of the global financial markets is a warning with 
much broader implications than yet acknowledged.  
It is tempting to imagine, as Plato did, a concentration of executive power in a 
manner that assures dedication to legitimate common purpose as well as the 
wisdom required to serve it. The overwhelming burden of historical judgment 
holds, however, that there is no such formula, a judgment most succinctly 
summarized in Lord Acton’s famous dictum: “power corrupts; absolute power 
corrupts absolutely.” Given that apparent feature of the human condition, it would 
not be appropriate to contemplate a constitutional redesign in response to the 
process of globalization, but it is therefore vital to accomplish adaptation by 
revising the operational consensus that prevails in the United States and by treating 
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the various interfering pathologies to which the political system is susceptible as 
they occur.  
The term operational consensus refers to the concepts of interest and to the 
principles used to pursue them that provide the basis for institutionalized policy. 
Broadly shared working assumptions about these matters are largely implicit and 
hence difficult to document directly, but they are necessary for any society to act 
coherently. They enable the actions of numerous individuals and organizations to 
be coordinated at feasible cost in terms of time and effort. The embedded 
assumptions that play this role for security policy have been forged through 
formative experience and extensive evolution. They are not easily changed because 
they must be replaced rather than simply abandoned and because the replacement 
process itself depends on formative experience and extensive evolution.  
For the United States, the formative experience that provides the foundation for 
contemporary security policy began with the Great Depression and ended with 
World War II. As a result of that sequence the federal government became far 
more consequential domestically than it had ever been before, and the United 
States itself became far more consequential internationally. It was a moment of 
maturation brought about not merely by the passing of time but by response to 
momentous events. It gave the country as a whole an organizing and energizing 
focus – the defeat of imperial aggression – that proved to be as vital for economic 
rehabilitation as for national defense.  
And for a half century thereafter a central feature of the experience was relived as 
the United States developed history’s most capable military establishment in 
perceived global confrontation with the Soviet Union, which was assumed to 
present a danger of imperial aggression comparable to the belligerent regimes of 
Germany and Japan. That assumption sustained the broadly accepted clarity of 
purpose that had been forged in the World War II experience and has provided 
justification for financing the military establishment at an average rate of more 
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than $400 billion per year in constant 2004 dollars.1 Clarity of purpose and 
justification for resource allocation are essential elements of an effective 
operational consensus.  
With the advantage of more detached retrospect, the strategic necessity of the Cold 
War confrontation can be questioned. But regardless of the judgment ultimately 
made in that regard, it is evident that whatever validity the legacy retained was 
vitiated in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its alliance system. 
Those events decisively removed any immediate possibility of conventional 
warfare on continental scale and hence any credible threat of globally significant 
imperial aggression. They did not eliminate the confrontation of intercontinental 
range nuclear forces that had supported the two opposing alliances, but it has been 
presumed that the deterrent effect of those forces would preclude their deliberate 
use once they were disconnected from any mission of territorial acquisition.  
The reigning concept of imperial threat has not been replaced, however, and it is 
extremely difficult to do so outside the context of an active war.  In the absence of 
a credible strategic enemy, it has been so far impossible to devise a practical 
substitute. The currently prominent phenomenon of terrorism cannot be equated 
with massive imperial aggression and cannot be addressed in the same way. Nor 
can a “rising” China be plausibly cast in the global imperialist role based on its 
history, current policies and extraordinarily demanding internal development 
imperatives. The United States as well as the international community as a whole 
is in serious need of an alternative formulation.  
ISSUES OF ADAPTATION 
The evident need derives not merely from the evaporation of the Cold War 
confrontation but from the rise of new circumstances. There are strong reasons to 
believe that the process of globalization is altering the dynamics of human 
societies to an extent that presents fundamentally different problems capable of 
overriding the traditional concern for territorial aggression. As capital and 
                                           




commodity markets have expanded to global scale, the determining dynamics of 
economic performance transcend any sovereign jurisdiction. In reacting to that 
largely spontaneous development, most major societies have directed their energies 
to compete primarily for productive investment and terms of trade rather than 
territorial control, and they are implicitly discounting the utility of military power. 
The U.S. investment in traditional military capability is not being matched 
anywhere in the world. The most immediately troublesome problems of security 
are arising from civil violence and embedded terrorism within established 
sovereign jurisdictions unable to command the internal social consensus necessary 
to control them. The global threat posed by those situations is not that of imperial 
aggression but rather social and economic disruption. The global economy is a 
system of currency, commodity and service-flows crossing formal legal 
jurisdictions. It is dependent on expectations and informal rules of accommodation 
that are sensitive to violence and vulnerable to criminal exploitation. It is 
generating conditions of grievance, moreover, in that the pattern of growth is 
highly inequitable with massive accumulations of wealth among a very few 
individuals and endemic hardship among large populations. Meanwhile, the 
aggregate effects of human activity have reached proportions capable of altering 
global ecological balances thereby generating threats that might in principle exceed 
traditional forms of warfare.  
But general recognition of these circumstances has not produced a fundamental 
change of operating principles. Preparations for traditional forms of warfare still 
dominate military investment, and the concepts of threat that underlie prevailing 
policy feature intrinsically aggressive strategic opponents no longer named but still 
proclaimed.  
There are those who defend continuation of the legacy formulation despite the 
evident change of circumstance. Since large-scale warfare contesting the control of 
territory has regularly occurred throughout history and has demonstrated its 
capacity to forge social consensus, they contend that it will never be otherwise and 
that deterrence and/or defeat of an imperial threat should remain the primary 
commitment of American security policy in anticipation of the eventual 
appearance of such a threat or, in the more sophisticated form, as an exercise in 
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deterring it. Whether expressed or implied, China and Russia are considered to be 
the prototype candidates. That line of argument endorses the established 
operational consensus and rejects any fundamental change. It has the considerable 
internal advantages of conceptual simplicity and institutionalized inertia, but it runs 
the considerable risk of making the United States itself appear to be an imperial 
threat to the rest of the world, a development that would have ruinous 
consequences in the context of globalization.  More ominously, it also virtually 
precludes the advanced forms of collaboration necessary to respond to distinctly 
different dangers.   
Precisely because an authoritative reformulation of operating principles has not yet 
occurred, the argument for doing so has less stature and less widespread 
recognition. The implications of the globalization process are nonetheless fairly 
evident. It is shifting both the scale and the character of primary threat. The 
traditional problem of large-scale military operations that by their nature are 
consciously hostile and centrally organized is receding in significance as 
investment is redirected. The principal immediate problems are posed by smaller 
scale but more widely dispersed and more spontaneously generated forms of 
violence that turn more on the dynamics of social consensus than the application of 
military force. The fundamental longer term problem is that of devising effective 
protection against ecological catastrophe. That emerging agenda basically requires 
global collaboration for mutual protection rather than military confrontation for 
national advantage and hence a change of prevailing attitudes as well as operating 
principles.  
The conceptual adjustment required is quite demanding. It cannot rely on familiar 
historical precedent since the entire case rests on the assertion of fundamental 
discontinuity – that is, the emergence of unprecedented circumstances. It cannot 
reduce canonical threats to the familiar image of intrinsically hostile, strategically 
calculating, centrally organized opponents. It cannot evoke the emotional power of 
belligerence that the traditional conception of threat inspires. It requires 
widespread acceptance within the United States that virtually all candidate enemies 
are not in fact intrinsically motivated but are instead reacting to perceived threats 
emanating from our superior military power and antagonistic policies. Similarly it 
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requires widespread comprehension of the distinction between a calculating 
opponent and a dangerous process. It has to extend concepts of vital interest to 
global scale, thereby transcending national identity and cultural affiliation. It has to 
elevate concepts of equity and legitimacy over national advantage and the raw 
exercise of coercive power. And all this has to be done while facing the inherent 
uncertainties of anticipation. As Søren Kirkegaard once remarked, “life is lived 
forward but understood backward.”  
The ability of the American political process to manage such an adjustment is yet 
to be determined, but the incentives for doing so make that an interesting question 
despite the imposing array of impediments and despite Kirkegaard’s trenchant 
observation.    
RECENT EXPERIENCE 
Both the imperative of adjustment and the difficulty of accomplishing it are 
intensified by the fact that the dominant impulse of the United States in the 
aftermath of the Cold War has been to extend rather than revise the underlying 
operational consensus. In the immediate aftermath, both the size of the military 
establishment and the supporting budget were cut about 30%, but preparation to 
defeat imperial aggression remained the central purpose. With the disappearance of 
any plausible immediate instance, hedging against the return of such a threat 
became the central justification, and higher standards of performance were set. 
During the final stages of the Cold War, U.S. conventional forces were officially 
expected to resist a Soviet assault on Western Europe only for three days before 
bringing the supposedly decisive effect of nuclear weapons to bear. Even though it 
was informally understood that they could and should expect to do much better 
than that, official doctrine and actual operational preparations were predicated on 
that assumption. In the aftermath of the Cold War with the windfall acquisition of 
global superiority, the standards were set higher. U.S. forces were to be able to 
defeat imperial aggression simultaneously occurring in two separate but 
unspecified theaters more rapidly and more decisively with fewer casualties.  
The setting of higher performance aspirations despite an overall reduction in forces 
was not merely or even primarily an acknowledgment of weaker opposition but 
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rather an endorsement of technical innovation. By the 1990s after more than a 
decade of dedicated investment, the application of dramatic advances in basic 
information processing technology had given U.S. forces substantially improved 
capability to perform traditional combat missions derived from the ability to 
identify and attack critical targets with unprecedented speed and precision. The 
significance of that development was demonstrated in the 1991 liberation of 
Kuwait and in yet more advanced form in the 2001 assault on Afghanistan and the 
2003 assault on Iraq when U.S. forces won field battles with extraordinary 
efficiency. For attentive military planners throughout the world, the central reality 
after 1991 was the progressive and increasingly effective pursuit of combat 
superiority by the United States, reflected not only in technical investment but in 
operational training and other essential features of policy. With advanced 
capabilities for battlefield surveillance, precise delivery of munitions, and global 
operational reach, the American military could expect to detect an imminent 
imperial threat in time to undertake a preemptive attack that would defeat it in 
advance – a far more efficient use of force than liberating territory after it had been 
aggressively occupied. 
That principle was demonstrated in 1995 when Iraq moved two of its relatively 
elite Republican Guard divisions to positions near the Kuwait border suggesting a 
reprise of its earlier attempt to annex the country. In response, both the United 
States and Great Britain undertook a counter mobilization and issued an ultimatum, 
backed by a UN resolution, warning Iraq to move the two divisions back to their 
normal deployment areas near Baghdad and threatening to attack them if they did 
not. The Iraq government complied with the ultimatum thereby setting a precedent 
in support of both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of preemptive action against 
impending attack.  
The question of legitimacy depended heavily on the credibility of the indictment, 
however. Saddam Hussein’s largely unprovoked attack on Kuwait in 1991 and his 
brutally repressive form of rule within Iraq had made him a prototype imperial 
aggressor in the judgment of most of the world. There was no dispute over the 
hostile intention attributed to the movement of forces within his own sovereign 
jurisdiction in 1995. But that does not mean that any assertion of imperial intent 
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issued by the United States would be broadly accepted in all instances as 
justification for preemptive action.  Preemptive attack undertaken against a country 
with exclusively defensive intentions would itself be an act of aggression. Since 
the attribution of intention is usually a matter of disputable judgment, response to 
aggression is far more readily justified than preemption. There is some inherent 
tension between efficiency and justification in the use of force.  
For that reason the attribution of intention, disputable as it might be, is a central 
feature of security policy, especially for Russia as principal heir of the Soviet 
legacy and implicit candidate for eventual peer competitor of the United States. 
Russia embarked in the aftermath of the Cold War on a massive internal 
transformation involving the fundamentals of social and political organization. It 
embraced the basic principles of consensual government and worked out election 
procedures for determining who would hold power. It embraced the basic 
principles of a market economy as well, dismantled the institutions of central 
economic direction and committed itself to global economic engagement featuring 
its oil and gas resources. It absorbed the remnants of the Soviet military 
establishment, including all of its nuclear weapons, but did not attempt to sustain 
the investment required to preserve the Soviet capacity for conventional power 
projection. It clearly aspired to accommodation with the industrial democracies.  
But within the United States, Russia has not been credited with constructive 
intention or good faith effort. Instead it has been held to advanced standards of 
performance and generally found to be insufficiently democratic and incompletely 
reformed. It has not been removed from the focus of U.S. deterrent force 
operations. As NATO expanded eastward, against assurances that had been given 
at the time of German unification, Russia has not been considered eligible for 
membership.  The unspoken but clearly conveyed implication is that Russia is to 
be indefinitely held in potential adversary status and hence potentially subject to 
American preemptive capability. The implicit attribution of imperial motives is a 
natural source of resentment and a significant practical concern for Russia – and 
similarly for China and any other country the United States chooses to consider a 
potential enemy.  
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The reasons for concern have intensified, moreover, in the aftermath of the 2001 
terrorist attacks. The highly emotional American response to that provocation 
reinforced the fear of implacable hostility that has anchored the prevailing 
operational consensus since the formative encounters with Germany and Japan in 
WW II. It also set a presumption that terrorists should be hunted down wherever 
they can be found and attacked before they themselves are able to attack. That 
reaction has extended military operations into the smaller scale forms of violence 
traditionally assigned to law enforcement agencies and has reinforced the principle 
of preemption. In a series of documents and pronouncements, the Bush 
administration declared that sovereign states will be held responsible for terrorist 
actions emanating from their territory, that those states suspected of sponsoring 
terrorist operations or of otherwise being hostile to the United States would not be 
allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction and that preemptive attack, 
including nuclear weapons if necessary, would be considered in instances of 
defiance.2 Iran, Iraq and North Korea were explicitly named as the principal 
suspects, and Iraq was in fact attacked in an exceedingly prominent application of 
the doctrine, even though it posed no immediate threat. More generally and less 
explicitly, military planning documents prepared with apparent administration 
approval proclaimed the intention to acquire “global dominance” by developing 
the capability for decisive attack against any state indulging in what the United 
States considers to be threatening behavior. The implication was that the rise of a 
peer competitor would be prevented by force if reason and natural inclination 
prove to be insufficient.  
Literally interpreted, the Bush administration security policy was an inherently 
provocative doctrine of preventive war, and it presented military professionals 
throughout the world with the problem of judging just how literally it was to be 
taken.  They could readily discern that it would not be feasible for the United 
States to achieve the degree of dominance required not merely to preempt against 
                                           





imminent threat but also to prevent the acquisition of competitive capabilities by 
any other country. They could also discount for the emotional effects of terrorist 
provocation within the American political system.  They could not entirely ignore, 
however, the implications of extending the preemption doctrine beyond the 
justifying context of imminent threat. The attack capability of U.S. nuclear and 
conventional forces already poses a significant threat both to Russian and to 
Chinese deterrent forces that is not balanced by any corresponding threat of their 
own. That disparity will increase under projected rates of military investment and 
will not be contained by any protective agreement currently in force or under 
official consideration. The Bush administration’s diplomacy essentially repudiated 
the framework of treaties originally designed to stabilize the confrontation between 
American and Soviet-era nuclear forces and generally denigrated the basic idea of 
negotiated restraint. The invasion of Iraq documented the U.S. willingness to 
initiate the use of force without international authorization and the ability to do so 
with minimal domestic scrutiny.  
The declaratory policy of the Obama administration has been more 
accommodating but has not explicitly repudiated the preemption doctrine and has 
not significantly redirected military investment.  In his speech in Prague in 2009, 
the President reaffirmed more prominently than his predecessors the commitment 
to eliminate nuclear weapons that was legally enacted in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and he promised to pursue some of the incremental 
measures long associated with that commitment. His administration subsequently 
negotiated the New START treaty implementing one of the promises – a reduction 
in the deployment of strategic-range nuclear weapons – but the terms of the treaty 
do not meaningfully redress the underlying imbalance in capability and exposure. 
The National Security Strategy document issued in May of 2010 emphasized the 
intention to “engage nations, institutions and peoples around the world on the basis 
of mutual interests and mutual respect,” and it generally subordinated the 
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prospective use of force to the announced policy of comprehensive engagement. 3 
But it did “reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary.”4  
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Obama in 2010 documented 
the extent to which his more accommodating tone has been noted and appreciated, 
but the underlying operational realities still impose a burden on those countries 
who believe they have reason for concern. The National Security Strategy 
statement extends preferential protection to formal allies, but it puts Russia, China 
and India into a separate category. Without directly threatening the use of force, it 
issues stern warning to Iran and North Korea. The preemption doctrine is no longer 
being starkly declared, but the capacity is being retained and the right to exercise it 
has been explicitly asserted.         
For most countries of the world, national security depends more on generally 
accepted rules of restraint than it does on their own exercise of military force. They 
cannot afford to act as if anarchy prevailed beyond their borders. The United States 
is the primary exception in that regard. With its military establishment far more 
capable than any other and its national territory far less vulnerable to intrusive 
threat, the principal security problem for the United States is justifying the 
privileged situation that circumstances have conferred.  And the key to solving that 
problem is understanding that the security of the United States cannot be separated 
from that of the rest of the world and cannot be based on an exceptional standard. 
Advantage can be tolerated depending on how it is used; absolute privilege 
aggressively exercised will not be tolerated.  
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Despite its dependence on consensual formulation of fundamental interest and on 
widely accepted operating principles to organize coherent policy, the American 
political system is not configured to decide those matters directly. Typically it 
makes specific decisions about budgets, military deployments and particular force 
applications leaving the underlying implications to be worked out informally and 
indirectly. If fundamental redirection of operational practice is to occur, it will 
happen in the process of engaging specific issues, and there are at least seven 
strong candidates for that catalytic role:  
 A transformation of deterrent force operations. 
 The establishment of a global system for accounting and physical control of 
nuclear weapons and explosive isotopes that would eventually enable higher 
standards of managerial control.  
 Resolution of the two principal problems of nuclear weapons proliferation, 
Iran and North Korea. 
 The development of new reactor designs, fuel cycle management practices 
and fundamental security relationships necessary to enable a large expansion 
of nuclear power generation in response to global warming. 
 The development of arrangements for oversight and reassurance sufficient to 
prevent the application of advanced biotechnology to destructive purposes. 
 The development of rules regulating the use of long-range, high-precision 
attack capability. 
 The engagement of forces in instances of civil conflict. 
The first four of these priorities are so closely related that they might be considered 
to constitute a single topic – the management of nuclear technology. Although that 
topic has only sporadically been the focus of prominent attention in recent years, it 
remains by far the greatest potential source of physical danger to the United States 
and to all other countries as well. Because of the potential consequence involved, 
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the disposition of nuclear weapons determines the fundamentals of security policy 
more than any other aspect of policy. The protective management of biotechnology 
and the regulation of precision attack have distinctly different features, but would 
have to be included in a comprehensive arrangement for the control of nuclear 
weapons. Engagement in civil conflict has been the principal application of 
military force in recent years, and that is likely to continue.  All of these issues 
involve a similar revision of basic principles and the development of new 
techniques of protection.  
Deterrent Force Operations 
As a practical matter, the respective deterrent forces of the United States and 
Russia set the basic condition of global security in that they jointly wield the 
largest potential source of destruction. The two coupled forces are widely 
considered to have established a stable balance of power arrangement, with each 
providing a global check on the other. Since that assumption has self-reinforcing 
features, there is an incentive to preserve it as long as the forces are active, but in 
fact it is doubtful that the deployment configuration meets the technical 
requirements of stability. The U.S. force has sufficient preemptive capability to put 
the Russian capacity for retaliation under some question, a fact that during the 
Cold War period would have been the occasion for very active diplomacy. Under 
its recent, assertively self-reliant policy, the United States has so far considered the 
disparity to be a legitimate advantage and at any rate has not accepted any direct 
discussion of mitigating it.  As best can be judged from the public record, the 
Russian government has not pressed the issue directly, but it is evident that its 
sensitivity to U.S. ballistic missile defense deployments is related to the underlying 
problem.   
Institutionalized policy in the United States currently envisages indefinite 
continuation of legacy operational practices under which American deterrent 
forces:  
 systematically prepare massive attack plans independent of any immediate 
circumstance of possible use; 
15 
 
 direct those attack plans primarily against Russian and Chinese military 
forces; and  
 maintain thousands of weapons on immediately available alert status capable 
of covering primary targets.  
It has long been recognized that those forces are technically configured and 
operationally inclined for preemption, despite the commitment to retaliation 
required by formal deterrence doctrine, for the basic reason that the priority 
counterforce purposes of the underlying attack plans can only be achieved if most 
of their specific missions are preemptive in character.  Given the disparity in 
investment, the U.S. capacity for preemption will continuously improve, forcing 
Russia into increased reliance on rapid reaction of its deterrent force and even 
anticipation of attack in order to assure itself that an American preemptive attack 
could not be completely decisive.  
Since it is extremely unlikely a preemptive attack could ever be reliably enough 
decisive to be either strategically or morally justified whatever the circumstances, 
the growing disparity is as much a problem for the United States as it is for Russia. 
Legacy deterrent practices entangle the two countries in an operational relationship 
that begs for revision for three basic reasons.  
First, the magnitude of threat embedded in the deployed forces does not remotely 
fit the deterrent rationale. Under current political circumstances it is not credible to 
claim that an adequate deterrent effect – that is, one necessary to dissuade a 
rational actor from initiating attack – requires threatening massive retaliation from 
thousands of nuclear weapons. To the extent that an operationally displayed 
retaliatory threat is required at all, an adequate deterrent effect could be achieved 
with tens of weapons targeted in response to immediate circumstances and 
probably less than ten would be sufficient. The wielding of thousands of 
preprogrammed weapons projects an intention to preempt rather than to deter, and 
that intention will never be practical and never legitimate from a global 
perspective. The United States is not independently strong enough to defy global 
opinion indefinitely.  
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Second, the continuous coupling of large alert forces programmed for massive 
attack certainly enables a catastrophic accident to occur. One can argue about the 
probability of such an event and one can hope that it has indeed been rendered very 
small by measures designed to assure prudent central control, as responsible 
officials regularly assert. There can be no credible categorical assurance, however. 
Indefinite continuation of legacy practices entails some risk of catastrophe that is 
essentially impossible to quantify and difficult to judge. The risk arises not from 
hostile intent but rather from the inherent difficulty of managing dispersed 
operations involving thousands of individuals. The categorical discounting of this 
risk bears some loose but ominous analogy to the spectacular failure to understand 
the dynamics of risk in the global financial markets. If adequate deterrence can be 
achieved without running the risk of active deterrent operations, there is no 
justification for doing so.  
Third, the dispersed pattern of weapons deployment resulting from legacy 
operations entails a greater risk of terrorist access than would be the case in a more 
protected configuration of forces. To the extent that deliberate assault from 
apocalyptic terrorists who could not be identified or located in advance is 
considered more likely than deliberate attack from any state leader who could be so 
identified, there is reason to shift to a more protected deployment pattern.   
Most individuals not embedded in the contemporary security bureaucracies readily 
identify an inherently superior configuration of deterrent forces involving hundreds 
rather than thousands of weapons that are not programmed for attack, are held in 
secure storage and are never put on immediately available alert status unless their 
actual use is immediately required. Suitably designed and supported by continuous 
monitoring, that configuration of forces would render any residual disparity in 
preemptive capacity far less threatening, would essentially eliminate the risk of 
catastrophic accident and would provide robust deterrent potential that could be 
specifically activated in any situation that appeared to require it. Moreover, by 
putting all nuclear weapons into secure, continuously monitored storage, that force 
configuration would also establish much higher standards of protection against 
unauthorized access.   
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Although such a transformation of prevailing practice is easily conceptualized, it 
would be difficult to accomplish. It would involve extensive institutional 
adjustments in Russia and in the United States and those adjustments would have 
to be carefully coordinated. Direct discussions between the two governments 
would be an essential first step, and formal negotiations would eventually be 
necessary.  A complete arrangement would ultimately require the agreement and 
alignment of the other nuclear weapons states as well, but it would be important for 
Russia and the United States as the main protagonists to initiate a process of 
progressive restraint on their forces. That would logically entail: 
 Gradual and explicitly scheduled removal of fabricated weapons from 
operational status to secure storage separated from delivery systems with 
associated verification arrangements. 
 Initiation of an international identification and continuous monitoring 
arrangement that in full maturity would provide the basis for accurate 
accounting and assured security of all fabricated weapons and explosive 
isotopes. 
 Reduction in the size of total stored national weapons stockpiles 
significantly below the asymptotic limit of mass social destruction 
(variously estimated in the range of 1000 – 1500 targets). 
 Categorical prohibition of any initial use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon 
for any purpose.  
 Corresponding prohibition on the unauthorized initial use of conventional 
weapons for any offensive mission.  
A revision of American security policy in response to emerging circumstance 
would require the organized pursuit of these measures, including formal 





Global Accounting 5 
In the process of developing the existing deterrent forces, more than 60,000 
nuclear weapons are believed to have been fabricated over the course of six 
decades, and a network of facilities has been established to produce the explosive 
isotopes they contain. Those facilities are embedded in the larger network that 
supports the 442 nuclear power reactors currently in operation throughout the 
world. Although nine principal isotopes have been identified that can sustain an 
explosive chain reaction well enough to be the basis for weapons designs, 
Plutonium 239 and Uranium 235 have so far been by far the most extensively used 
for that purpose. The combined global stocks of Plutonium and Highly Enriched 
Uranium (HEU) are estimated to be at least 1,800 metric tons, in principle enough 
for more than 150,000 weapons.6   
Accounting and physical security for weapons actually fabricated and for their 
dedicated materials has been handled by separate national governments who do not 
inform each other in authoritative detail. As a result no one knows the total 
inventory. The United States government estimates of the number of nuclear 
weapons that currently exist has an uncertainty range of numbering in the 1,000s, 
even though each single weapon is itself an agent of mass destruction. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors most but not all of the 
materials involved in nuclear power generation but does not claim to provide a 
comprehensive, exactly accurate account of the current global inventory let alone 
the history of explosive isotope production. The uncertainties of historical 
production are such that it is inherently doubtful a global account accurate to a 
single weapons unit of material could ever be constructed. Legacy practices have 
disseminated nuclear explosive materials to an extent that apparently precludes 
exact knowledge of the threat they represent.  
                                           
5 Adapted from John Steinbruner, “Burdens of Proof,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 63 
# 1, January/February 2007, pp. 59 – 61. 




During the period when deliberate mass attack was considered to be the dominant 
form of threat, uncertainty about individual weapons did not appear to be 
significant. With thousands of weapons arrayed in active confrontation, there was 
no reason to believe that the viability of deterrence depended on the exact number. 
If terrorist use is admitted to be a serious concern, however, the accounting and 
physical security of every weapon and the equivalent amount of explosive material 
become matters of priority. Although it may never be possible to achieve an 
exactly accurate global system of managerial control, substantial improvement in 
current practice is definitely possible and is likely to become an insistent demand if 
ever there is an incident that validates fear of a terrorist threat.  
It is technically possible to devise a common accounting and physical security 
system that would assure continuous monitoring of weapons and materials in 
secure storage and would make unauthorized and undetected diversion extremely 
difficult to accomplish. Such a system could establish international standards while 
controlling access to the details of design and location that national governments 
are dedicated to protecting. The development of such a system lies outside the 
bounds of political tolerance at the moment, but if the imagined threat of terrorism 
is ever demonstrated to be real prevailing attitudes would presumably be revised.  
Even a fully developed international accounting process would have to operate 
over many years, probably decades, before uncertainties regarding historical 
production receded to the point of relative insignificance and confidence in its 
accuracy and inclusiveness became established. For that reason it is important to 
begin formal diplomatic discussions of such a system, involving all of the states 
that are currently believed to possess fabricated weapons as well as those whose 
explosive isotope inventories provide the basis for rapid weapons deployment.  
Those discussions would be another essential first step in a process of adjusting 
fundamental security policy to emerging circumstance.   
 
Control of Proliferation 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was pioneered by the United 
States in the late 1960s, has subsequently become one of the most widely endorsed 
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international agreements. Since its entry into force in 1970, the NPT has gained 
nearly universal adherence and has been extended by consensus indefinitely 
beyond its original 25-year duration. There are currently 190 states parties to the 
treaty, at least nine of which have reversed national nuclear weapons programs that 
would have precluded their adherence as non-nuclear weapons states. Two 
instances of clandestine violation of the treaty – South Africa and Iraq – have been 
reversed.  All four of the countries that do not currently adhere to the treaty -- 
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea -- are credited with having nuclear 
weapons in some sense, but that limited set of exceptions has so far not overturned 
the prevailing norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons. There are many 
parties to the treaty who could more readily develop nuclear weapons than the four 
current exceptions, but none has chosen to do so.  
Despite the evident strength of the NPT regime and the underlying norm it reflects, 
it is nonetheless considered susceptible to radical breakdown for three basic 
reasons. First, the five states authorized by the treaty to deploy nuclear weapons on 
an interim basis have not seriously pursued the obligation to eliminate them that 
was explicitly expressed in Article VI of the treaty. Of the 13 criteria specified at 
the 2000 review conference as indication of a good-faith effort, several have been 
explicitly repudiated by the United States, a fact that prevented the 2005 review 
conference from establishing an agenda, holding substantive discussions or issuing 
a report. The 2010 review conference did issue a consensus report reiterating the 
demand that the 13-step program of 2000 be seriously pursued. Second, there is an 
evident flaw in the treaty in that it allows any state to acquire nuclear explosive 
materials as long as their holdings are documented. That enables a willful rogue to 
develop a materials stockpile under legal protection and then abandon its 
obligation not to develop weapons by evoking the three-month withdrawal clause 
provided by Article X of the treaty. With a sufficient amount of Plutonium or HEU 
available, most advanced industrial states could fabricate viable weapons within a 
year. Third, there is perceived danger that regional resonance of the Indian, 
Pakistani and Israeli nuclear programs might so undermine the global arrangement 
that it cannot be sustained.  
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Serious discussion of deterrent force transformation and of a global accounting 
arrangement would respond to the article VI obligation.  Both are almost certainly 
necessary conditions for any credible effort to approach ultimate elimination and 
would be recognized as such. Dealing with the other two concerns, however, will 
predictably require some specific resolution of the Iran situation. Iran is currently 
suspected of intending to exploit the NPT flaw. Were it actually to do so, the 
regional reverberations would be extensive and dangerous.  
In terms of technical capability, Iran is a much less immediate a threat to the NPT 
regime than is North Korea. The DPRK, which formally withdrew from the treaty 
in 2006, is credited with having some 40-50 kilograms of separated plutonium and 
has at least nominally demonstrated the capacity to fabricate weapons out of that 
material. In 2005, North Korea agreed in principleto dismantle its entire nuclear 
program and did shut down its 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon. The detailed schedule 
for pursuing the dismantlement process has been delayed by a dispute regarding 
disclosure of all the DPRK’s nuclear activities, and the entire deal may be 
endangered by the failing health of the central leader, Kim Jong il. The agreed 
arrangement does not provide any direct benefit for the North Korean military 
whose compliance in the absence of authoritative political leadership cannot be 
assumed. Nonetheless, the core logic of the agreement has survived repeated 
political assault for fifteen years – implicit testimony to the fact that it provides a 
superior outcome for all the countries involved. If continuity in North Korea’s 
policy is preserved, reasonable accommodation by the United States should enable 
the agreement to be completed. Up to this point at least, the difficulties of 
implementation have had as much to do with undisciplined political antagonism in 
the United States as with intransigence in North Korea.  
In the case of Iran there is no agreement in principle on the terms of a settlement 
and no direct negotiations with the United States. Iran has repeatedly denied any 
intention to develop nuclear weapons but since 2006 has also defied all 
international appeals to suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing activities, including UN Security Council resolution 1696 issued in 
July 2006.  Iran had earlier admitted to the IAEA in 2003 that it had conducted 
uranium enrichment and plutonium separation experiments dating back to 1981 
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and had failed to disclose them as required by it safeguards agreement. Iran 
suspended its enrichment and separation efforts in 2003 and agreed to comply with 
the more intrusive IAEA inspection procedures established by the Advanced 
Protocol. The U.S. intelligence community recently stated that Iran also terminated 
a clandestine nuclear weapons design program at that time. The defiance that 
began in 2006 thus reversed an earlier policy of accommodation. One can 
speculate about the reasons, but it is worth noting that over its two-year duration, 
the policy of accommodation elicited no commensurate reaction from the United 
States. 
The current impasse creates an inherently volatile situation. Because of Iran’s 
extensive exposure to IAEA inspection, a great deal is definitively known about 
the state and location of Iran’s enrichment activities. The IAEA reported in 
September of 2010 that the gas centrifuge cascades operating at Natanz had 
produced 2,803 kilograms of low enriched uranium (< 5% U 235) since beginning 
production in February of 2007.7 There was no accounting discrepancy suggesting 
that additional material had been produced but not recorded. Under reasonable 
assumptions about the exact product and waste tails assays that suggests that Iran 
could obtain 25 kg of HEU – the IAEA definition of a significant quantity –from 
the same centrifuge cascade in less than 2 months. The IAEA also reported smaller 
scale operations of more advanced centrifuge designs which would reduce the 
processing time required.  But even those designs are less capable by a factor of 
100 or more than the centrifuges currently used in state-of -the art facilities and 
hence are very far from being commercially competitive.  
Those observations do suggest that the production of HEU for weapons application 
might be the ultimate intention and that Iran is approaching the the capacity to do 
so with limited warning time. They also suggest that an attack on the Natanz 
facility and perhaps on the uranium conversion facility as well would significantly 
delay Iran’s acquisition of weapons capability. Since both the United States and 
Israel have the capacity to undertake such an attack and are believed to have some 
                                           
7 IAEA report GOV/2010/46 6, September 2010 
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inclination to do so, there is some urgency in devising a more constructive 
solution.   
As with the transformation of deterrent operations, the basic elements of a solution 
are readily apparent, and in fact they are officially outlined in the agreement with 
North Korea – the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of Six Party Talks. The 
basic requirement accepted by North Korea in that document is complete 
dismantlement of their nuclear materials production facilities and transfer of their 
accumulated plutonium stocks to international control in exchange for security 
assurances from the United States and normalization of political and economic 
relations. Implied in the outline of the arrangement is the requirement that North 
Korea cede the right to national control over nuclear materials in exchange for 
assurances of equitable – that is, de-politicized – access to international fuel cycle 
services. Were that to become the new standard for any additional country 
proposing to develop nuclear reactor technology, it would close the loophole in the 
NPT.   
Extending that formula to Iran would require the United States to offer security 
assurances – that is, a commitment not to initiate attack – which Iran would 
probably insist be ratified by the international community generally. It would 
probably also require some adjustment for the fact that Iran has not yet completely 
mastered uranium enrichment technology and therefore has not established the 
hedge of knowledge that North Korea has established with regard to plutonium 
production. One can imagine an outcome in which Iran is allowed to operate the 
Natanz facility under Advanced Protocol inspection provided that enrichment 
levels do not exceed, say, 5%, that overall production does not exceed, say, 50 
kg/year and that all enriched product is placed under international control.  
Since the United States has not offered to Iran the security assurances and full 
normalization of relations it has offered in principle to North Korea, there has not 
as yet been a fair test of Iranian intentions. If that offer were credibly made along 
with assurances of access to nuclear fuel cycle services, there would be no good 
reason for Iran to refuse it. Even if Iran does harbor some underlying inclination to 
pursue a nuclear weapons option, it has in fact very little prospect of 
accomplishing an overt, operationally capable deployment of nuclear weapons it 
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could rely upon for deterrent protection. Given the repeated denials that Iran’s 
leaders have issued and given the regional reverberations that would result, a 
suddenly announced or independently discovered nuclear weapons development 
effort would not be considered legitimate and would be exposed to preemptive 
attack. Given those circumstances accommodation with Iran using the formula 
developed for North Korea has very good prospect of succeeding and of thereby 
solidifying the NPT regime to the extent that any additional defections become 
very unlikely.  
 
Global Warming8 
The problem of global warming has some potential to become the dominant, 
organizing concern that fear of massive imperial assault was from WWII up to the 
end of the Cold War. Although the forces of nature are not considered to be a 
willful enemy capable of deliberate aggression, they are in principle capable of yet 
greater destructive consequence, and it is becoming apparent that the effects of 
aggregate human activity on global ecology are posing major issues of strategic 
protection for reasons that are evident from a few basic observations.  
We are in the midst of a surge in the size of total human population. Barring some 
unusual calamity, by 2025 six billion people will have been added to the two 
billion total of 1950 when the surge began. That has driven global economic 
growth which has in turn intensified the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. It has been determined at a high level of scientific confidence that 
human induced greenhouse gas concentrations will double over pre-industrial 
(1750) levels by 2050 and that a significant rise in average surface temperature will 
result unless offset by some phenomenon not yet identified with anything like the 
                                           
8 Portions of this section have been adapted from John Steinbruner and Tim Gulden, “The 
Security Implications of Global Warming” in Public Policy: Current Thinking on Critical Issues, 
Winter 2008, Maryland School of Public Policy, University of Maryland. 
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same level of confidence. The amount of the increase is expected to fall in the 
range of 2-4 degrees Celsius with much larger local variations. 9 
The geological record indicates that substantial changes in global climate patterns 
could result from average temperature increases in that range, but the magnitude, 
timing, probability, consequence and even the basic character of those changes 
cannot be determined with the same level of confidence. By the time such 
determinations could be made, it would be too late to prevent the more serious of 
the possibilities that might threaten human societies on a truly massive scale – 
rapid rises in sea levels, for example, or sudden releases of frozen gas hydrates. To 
protect against calamity potentially greater than the worst of history’s wars, 
prudence seems to require preventive efforts directed at energy production and use 
well before the exact dangers can be defined.   
Tolerable preventive efforts must assure sufficient energy production, however, to 
enable rising standards of living among the poorest segments of the world 
population where more than 95% of the population increase has been occurring. 
Since the globalizing economy has been concentrating wealth among the very rich, 
there is good reason to worry about the consequences for social coherence and for 
the incidence of civil violence and associated terrorism if the poor do not at least 
experience improvement. In addition to a shared commitment to prevent global 
destruction, concern for standards of equity creates a strong connection between 
global warming and security policy as do the potential means for transforming 
energy production.  
In order to keep climate disruptions down to a level to which we can be reasonably 
confident that humanity can adapt, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gasses will have to be held at the doubling over pre-industrial levels that is already 
essentially unavoidable – that is, at about 500 ppm – by 2050. That in turn will 
require a transformation of the technical basis for energy generation from sources 
that emit greenhouse gasses (roughly 80% at the moment) to those that do not 
                                           
9Climate Change and Water, Technical Paper VI, International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
June 2008 (available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tp-climate-change-water.htm). 
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(currently 20% -- much of which is hydropower which has limited potential for 
expansion). In order to assure some economic progress at all income and wealth 
levels as a basic standard of equity, this transformation will have to be 
accomplished as the overall level of energy production is increased by a factor of 2 
– 3 and large efficiency gains are also achieved.   
There are five technologies that can in principle enable such a transformation to be 
accomplished in the time required – wind, solar, biomass, nuclear fission and 
carbon sequestration. Of these, carbon sequestration is currently the most popular, 
but the scale on which sequestration techniques can be responsibly applied is a 
major question. Any sequestration scheme associated with carbon-based energy 
generation must demonstrate to a high level of confidence that over the course of 
several centuries it will not produce slow leaks or sudden surges.  If it did, 
extensive commitment to that technique would be disastrous. There are some 
techniques that might provide highly reliable sequestration but because of cost and 
scale limitations those are more likely to be supplements to a mitigation strategy 
than prime methods. Those that might be applied at the cost and scale required of a 
prime method are unlikely to be able to demonstrate reliable endurance.  
Of the other options, nuclear power generation is intrinsically the most promising 
but would have to meet its own burden of proof; namely, that utilization could be 
safely expanded by a factor of 5 – 10 without enabling a ruinous process of nuclear 
weapon proliferation. Concern about proliferation applies not only to potentially 
belligerent states but also to assuredly belligerent terrorist organizations.  
The option of nuclear power generation cannot meet that burden of proof on the 
basis of current reactor designs, current fuel cycle management practices and 
current international security relationships among the critical participants – the 
United States, the European Union, Russia, China and India. Expansion on that 
basis would entail too grave a risk of dangerous proliferation to be sustained. There 
are technically viable reactor designs, however, that would be substantially more 
resistant to proliferation dangers, in particular designs in which the fuel would be 
sealed within the reactor for the duration of its service. Those could be 
manufactured in small 50 or 100 MW units at a few internationally managed 
facilities, shipped to the location of use in whatever numbers would be required for 
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that location, and then returned to the original manufacturing facility for 
disposition of the used fuel. Development of those designs in combination with 
internationalized control of fuel services, a comprehensive nuclear materials 
accounting system, and transformation of deterrent force operations would create 
conditions under which the burden of proof could be met. That combination of 
circumstances would make the expansion of nuclear power generation a viable 
option, and it will be difficult to contain global warming without it. Although 
wind, solar and biomass will undoubtedly be developed and utilized, they are 
unlikely to be alone sufficient.  
Of all the substantive incentives for a more accommodating reformulation of 
security policy, global warming seems likely to be the most powerful over the 
longer term. It is reasonable to expect both that the problem itself will become a 
riveting concern at the head of state level over the next decade and that the 
implications for the management of nuclear technology will become sufficiently 
imposing to override the entrenched resistance of legacy policies.   
 
Biotechnology 10 
Progress in understanding basic life processes at the molecular level has been 
especially dramatic in recent years as intricate details have been revealed about 
operations of the human immune system and strong hints about the regulation of 
cognitive, emotional and reproductive functions have emerged as well. The degree 
of understanding achieved is certainly not complete, but it is advanced enough to 
indicate that extraordinarily powerful applications are likely to become possible. 
One can plausibly imagine the eradication of historical diseases, but unfortunately 
one can even more plausibly imagine the creation of diseases far more destructive 
than those that have naturally evolved.  Similarly one can imagine both 
constructive therapy and malign manipulation of behavior on a mass scale. 
                                           
10 For more extensive discussion see John Steinbruner, Elisa D. Harris, Nancy Gallagher, Stacy 
M. Okutani, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System, 
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland, March 2007. 
28 
 
Fundamental science undertaken by a globally dispersed biomedical research 
community for compellingly justified reasons is enabling highly destructive 
application as an unavoidable byproduct.  
This circumstance imposes an extraordinary burden of management. The 
momentum of discovery is driven almost entirely by very strong constructive 
intentions whose legitimacy is beyond question. It would be infeasible and 
undesirable to try to interfere in any fundamental way. But the destructive 
implications loom as a danger too massive to be ignored indefinitely. As it 
becomes evident how hundreds of millions or even billions of people might be put 
at risk by the deliberate creation of an advanced pathogen, it also becomes 
important to devise some systematic means of preventing such a development even 
if no one currently appears to intend it.  And there are two competing impulses in 
that regard. The first is to try to sequester all of the enabling information under 
national security classification. The second is to force systematic transparency so 
that the very powerful established norm against destructive application can be 
applied in timely fashion. 
In reaction to the anthrax letters in 2001, the United States has indulged both 
impulses. It has added more than a billion dollars annually to protective research to 
be conducted within the public health establishment largely under transparency 
rules. But it has also initiated a threat assessment program within the Department 
of Homeland Security designed to identify the technical opportunities that 
terrorists might exploit. And to prevent said terrorists from exploiting the 
opportunities identified, a substantial portion of the work is to be classified. The 
underlying supposition is that the primary threat is posed by implacable terrorists 
who cannot be restrained by any norm.  
As a practical matter, however, that supposition is so questionable that it will not 
be readily accepted by the rest of the world, particularly given the fact that the 
2001 anthrax attacks were generated from within the United States apparently by 
an individual intimately involved in what is supposed to be protective research. It 
is not widely believed that terrorists are capable of developing advanced 
pathogens. The research apparatus required to do such a thing entails too much of 
an investment and too great a risk of exposure for that to be the principal concern. 
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If terrorists do attempt to use biological agents, the overwhelming probability is 
that they will rely on known agents that can be far more readily acquired, in which 
case the threat posed is comparable to that of naturally occurring infectious 
diseases and the appropriate measures of protection involve strengthening standard 
public health provisions. The greatest concern in that regard does involve anthrax, 
an agent that is readily found in the natural environment but not in a form that 
enables aerosol dissemination over a large area. By appropriating standard 
commercial equipment, a terrorist organization might be able to make a 
preparation of anthrax spores that would put up to a million people at risk in an 
urban area, but early detection and rapid dissemination of antibiotics would defeat 
such an attack. It does not qualify as a threat of mass destruction comparable to 
nuclear explosives or a spontaneously infectious pathogen. 
The greater risk is that government sponsored threat assessment programs having 
identified the method for creating a pathogen that could not be defeated by 
advanced public health measures will generate programs for exploiting the 
possibility, most plausibly out of fear that some other government is doing so. 
Classified threat assessment programs risk triggering that perverse dynamic, which 
could ultimately have massively ruinous consequences.  If that outcome is to be 
reliably avoided, transparency measures will have to be applied to all threat 
assessment activities in order to convey reassurance.  
In all other human activities where very large consequences are at stake – the 
handling of nuclear weapons, for example, or the disposition of large sums of 
money— requirements for independent oversight are imposed as a standard 
method of protection, and it is predictable that that method will eventually be 
applied to sensitive areas of biological research as well. Since that has to be done 
on a global basis to be effective, the imperative to work out a robust but acceptable 
oversight arrangement promises to give some considerable impetus to a redirection 





Precision Attack 11 
The aspiration to dominate space for national military advantage has been stated in  
a series of United States military planning documents which also discuss the 
programmatic implications in extensive detail.12 The documents express the 
intention to develop space assets that can observe threats as they arise, attack them 
before they are able to inflict harm on the United States, protect the assets that do 
this and deny similar capability to any other country. Those who understand the 
physics and economics of space operations can readily conclude that those 
aspirations cannot be accomplished, in particular that the United States could not 
prevent the destruction of its space assets if other countries with space launch 
capability considered them to be unacceptably threatening. It is apparent, however, 
that advanced sensing, communications relay and navigation services based in 
space are enabling precision strike missions to be performed at global range. In 
addition to making standard bombardment missions substantially more efficient, 
those developments are also enabling forms of retribution and coercive intrusion 
that were not possible in previous eras. 
As the leading and so far the nearly exclusive practitioner of that emerging 
capability, the United States has been circumspect about it, but there have been 
some notable demonstrations. In November of 2002, a remotely piloted drone 
aircraft believed to have been operated by CIA personnel destroyed a car traveling 
in the desert in Yemen that was said to be carrying a known terrorist along with 
several other people. More recently there have been reports of similar attacks on 
houses in the remote tribal areas of Pakistan where al Qaeda leaders were said to 
have gathered. The Yemen incident did not stimulate any prominent reaction and 
                                           
11 For more extensive discussion see Nancy Gallagher and John Steinbruner, Reconsidering the 
Rules for Space Security, Occasional Paper, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2008. 
12 United States Air Force, Joint Vision 2020 (June 2000); Report of the Commission to Assess 
United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Rumsfeld Space 
Commission), (January 11, 2001); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 
Joint Publication 3-14 (August 9, 2002); Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan FY04 
and Beyond, (November 5, 2002); United States Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 




the attacks in Pakistan so far generated some strong expressions of concern about 
sovereign jurisdiction but not yet aggressive reaction. It is evident, however, that 
missions of this sort are inherently controversial and that repetition is bound to 
generate very sharp dispute. The Yemen incident was in effect a summary 
execution apparently unconstrained by any legal deliberation. It will not be 
indefinitely acceptable to evade the due process of law simply by evoking the word 
terrorist. Nor will it be indefinitely acceptable to conduct clandestine lethal attacks 
on someone else’s sovereign territory. Development of remote attack capability 
without formal legal restraint would subject prominent individuals throughout the 
world to a continuous threat of assassination and critical infrastructure assets to a 
corresponding threat of damage.  When the United States comes to realize that it 
cannot indefinitely exercise that capability and also monopolize it, it will itself 
become exceedingly interested in rules of restraint.  
It is not evident what the most appropriate venue for working out rules of restraint 
would be, but the regulation of space activity would certainly have to be 
prominently involved. Whether or not space assets are absolutely necessary for 
precision strike missions, there is a strong presumption that navigation and 
communication relay services are important, and that makes them vulnerable to 
antagonistic reaction. For many years virtually the entire international community 
has been attempting to mandate formal negotiations to update the rules that 
currently regulate space activity, and the United States has alone been blocking 
that effort lest it impose restraint on ballistic missile defense development efforts. 
That stance, which reflects the ideology of self reliance, ignores the broader 
American interest in protective regulation. United States space assets are the most 
capable, the most expensive and most vulnerable of those that share the 
environment. They cannot be defended by belligerent, self-reliant means. They 
depend on the tolerance of other countries.  That fact, in context of the other above 
mentioned issues, gives very strong incentive not only to agree to formal 
negotiations but to seek to establish robust rules against interference with space 
assets. In order to acquire that protection, the United States will have to accept 
some restraint on its own actions, as a security policy revised in response to 




During the formative period of the Cold War, the primary danger of global 
imperial aggression was focused in Central Europe where the two opposing 
alliances maintained large concentrations of conventional forces prepared to 
initiate attack or undertake active defense within a few weeks. There was also a 
second confrontation of that sort on the Korean peninsula that still remains in some 
sense but is no longer connected to a broader confrontation. In retrospect it appears 
that the Soviet Union’s security policy was less aggressive and more defensive 
than assumed at the time and that for both sides their main forces deployments 
were contingency preparations for battles they expected to prevent by undertaking 
the preparations. The two alliances did engage in proxy battles throughout the 
world, however, by providing material support for rival factions contesting control 
of immature or otherwise unstable sovereign governments. Although the massive 
battles that could have occurred in Central Europe did not, the magnitude of 
conflict increased throughout the world, especially between 1960 when the 
stalemate in Central Europe had become established and 1990 when it dissolved.  
Since 1990 the global magnitude of conflict has declined back down to the 1960 
level, reflecting in significant part the termination of Cold War proxy battles.13 The 
basic ideological division between authoritarian socialism and market democracy 
that provided the ostensible justification for the proxy conflicts has more or less 
been settled, and the Soviet alliance has disappeared as a major patron.   
The United States military establishment emerged from that formative period with 
extreme reluctance to engage in indigenous civil conflict, a reluctance forged 
primarily by its experience in Vietnam. At operational levels there was intense 
frustration at the restraints imposed by political context, including the performance 
of drafted troops. The reaction was, first, to shift to an all volunteer force better 
trained to conduct the major battles associated with the primary Central Europe 
contingency and, second, to promote what came to be known as the Powell 
                                           




doctrine – use force decisively and with full political support or not at all.14 That 
set a strong presumption against committing United States forces in situations 
where its large-scale combat capabilities could not be effectively applied. Those 
capabilities, which were designed for field engagements against a similarly 
configured opponent largely outside of urban areas, were not suitable for civil 
conflict requiring counterinsurgency operations inextricably entangled with 
civilian populations.  
The American political system as a whole turned out to be more ambivalent, 
however. The Powell doctrine was generally endorsed and transmitted in those 
instructions that were officially issued. There was a series of very prominent 
exceptions, however, as United States combat forces came to be engaged in 
indigenously generated civil conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo and even 
more seriously in ones that it generated itself in Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of 
applying decisive force in the occupation of those two countries. That extended 
sequence of events forged a domestic consensus that the United States military 
should systematically prepare for civil conflict contingencies, but consensus 
emerged only in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Authoritative instructions to 
train for civil conflict missions were first issued in late September of that year – 
much too late to shape the extensive engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq that 
were undertaken in the ensuing two years. 15   
Having plunged into these engagements on the basis of an operational doctrine that 
was very successfully implemented in both cases, the United States is now in the 
process of contending with the limits of its validity. As should have been 
anticipated but was not, decisive force is not alone sufficient to produce a 
successful outcome in any situation and especially not in situations of civil 
conflict. Consensual legitimacy, the critical ingredient of effective justification, 
plays a comparably important and at least partially competitive role. In the case of 
Afghanistan the initial operation enjoyed presumptive legitimacy under the 
                                           
14 Colin Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, No. 5, Winter 
1992/93. 
15 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, U.S. Department of Defense, September 30, 2001 
(available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf ). 
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principle of self-defense in the estimation of most of the world, but as even a 
cursory examination of history would suggest that was not sufficient within 
Afghanistan. The United States did not commit resources adequate to provide local 
security throughout the country or to regenerate viable government in a country 
intensely resistant to any authority extending beyond the local level. It is now 
encountering active insurgency entrenched in the Pashtun area that extends into 
Pakistan, and it is not able to contest local legitimacy in those areas.  
The U.S. operation in Iraq was undertaken in defiance of prevailing international 
judgment, and the justification offered – alleged possession of weapons of mass 
destruction in violation of international agreements – proved to be specious. The 
operation triggered extensive internal violence reflecting a fundamental breakdown 
of legal order throughout the country that activated local predators and organized 
insurgents. The initial surge of violence has now been contained but hardly 
eliminated, and the method used makes it susceptible to reoccurrence. Previously 
predatory militia are being paid by the United States to establish security in their 
area of control thereby endorsing in effect their extraction of resources from those 
areas. The more broadly organized insurgent operations have been defeated or at 
least suppressed, but the resulting situation of balkanized control makes it difficult 
to form an effective central government from the fragments of a completely 
shattered political system. In response to the experience, the United States has 
revised its operational doctrine to feature counterinsurgency missions, but it has 
not yet generated a credible policy of stabilization and reconstruction either for 
Iraq or for Afghanistan.  
Since the ultimate outcome is in doubt in both instances so also are the enduring 
implications, but there are some strong presumptions. Complete disengagement of 
U.S. forces does not appear feasible any time soon. Especially in Iraq, they provide 
protection against external incursion that will continue to be necessary and that 
national forces will not be able to assure. The date for complete withdrawal 
specified in the recently concluded Status of Forces agreement is questionably 
realistic. Nonetheless, disengagement from counterinsurgency missions is likely to 
become a practical imperative. United States forces and those currently allied with 
them do not have and cannot expect to acquire the legitimacy required to master 
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the dynamics of internally generated violence. That basic fact implies that a 
successful reconstruction process would have to be managed by a much broader 
international consortium that could credibly represent the interests of the world as 
a whole and might be able to command consensual acceptance for that reason.  
However the details work out, it is prudent to assume that adequate stabilization in 
Iraq and Afghanistan will require substantial international assistance from sources 
currently considered to be antagonistic. Constructive engagement with Iran would 
certainly be required, as would the active cooperation of Russia and China. All 
three countries would in turn require credible reassurance, not only about basic 
purposes in Iraq and Afghanistan but about global security policy generally. The 
management of civil conflict and associated terrorism cannot be disentangled from 




If the leading substantive issues provide the specific focus necessary to engage the 
operating principles of security policy, relationships among the principal military 
establishments are the more fundamental determinants of those principles. As 
reflected in all of the substantive issues, the security relationship between Russia 
and the United States is still based on active confrontation as an extension of the 
Cold War pattern. As far as the United States security bureaucracy is concerned, 
that is also the prevailing and projected character of the security relationship with 
China, although in that case confrontation is less reciprocal, less actively practiced 
and more starkly contradicted by the fact of extensive economic engagement. If the 
basic principles of policy are to be revised in response to the process of 
globalization, then there will have to be explicit accommodation with Russia and 
China subordinating the practices of active confrontation in order to establish 
collaboration for mutual protection as the dominant mode of operation. That is an 
emotional as well as a conceptual matter and is correspondingly more difficult to 
bring into focus. It is nonetheless the central question.  
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In terms of surface rhetoric, accommodation has already been proclaimed. 
Speaking at official diplomatic events or in broad public venues, U.S. officials 
have repeatedly declared that they do not consider Russia or China to be immediate 
enemies even as they continue in congressional testimony to cite the rise of a peer 
competitor as justification for continued investment in the capacity for direct 
confrontation. Substantive provisions of accommodation have not been developed, 
however, and the natural means of doing so – the diplomatic process that supported 
the bilateral arms control provisions during the Cold War—has largely been 
dismantled. The declarations of benign intent are contradicted by the 
preventive/pre-emptive doctrine and are compounded by refusal to acknowledge 
the implicit implications for candidate “peers.” A threat that is wielded but not 
mentioned is distinctly ominous for those who might be subjected to it.   
The U.S. political system presents impediments to an accommodating revision of 
security relationships at least as significant as those inhibiting specific revisions of 
policy. There are intense minorities axiomatically antagonistic to Russia and to a 
lesser extent to China as well. Neither country has an actively supportive internal 
constituency of any major political consequence. An explicit program of 
accommodation would assuredly encounter active opposition not balanced by 
assertive support. Proponents would be burdened by antagonistic reactions to 
Russia’s recent military action against Georgia and its assertive sponsorship of 
independence for the ethnic enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Majority 
American sentiment appears to endorse the basic idea of accommodation, however, 
and that suggests there is permissive leeway for leadership on the question. 
Security relationships are intuitively more comprehensible, moreover, than are the 
substantive issues of policy. As compared to the Cold War period, a much greater 
portion of the United States electorate has been directly exposed to Russian and 
Chinese society, and some degree of constructive social engagement has occurred 
as a result. Fundamental security accommodation is reasonably judged to be 






The emergence of the Russian Federation as principal heir to the Soviet security 
legacy provided an initial opportunity for fundamental accommodation. While 
absorbing the bulk of Soviet military assets – all of its nuclear weapons and 
roughly half of its conventional forces – Russia set a context of policy that 
precluded dedication to imperial aggression. Its initial defense budget was a small 
fraction of what the Soviet’s had been, and its primary concern was that of 
securing political jurisdiction and operational control over the inherited forces. As 
they embraced the basic principles of market democracy and began the process of 
internal transformation, the founding leaders of the Russian Federation apparently 
hoped and even expected that their evident redirection would qualify them for 
inclusion in the ascendant economic and security arrangements of the industrial 
democracies.16   
 The extent of their responsiveness was not tested, however, since the United States 
was not prepared to undertake or even seriously consider the revision of its policy 
that fundamental accommodation would have required. In response to the 
attempted coup against the Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachov in August of 1991 
the George H.W. Bush administration did initiate a rapid, unilateral reduction in 
the number of deployed nuclear weapons designed primarily to deactivate shorter 
range systems controlled by forward commanders. That action was inspired by fear 
that the Soviet political leadership might lose control of their short-range systems 
deployed along the front in Central Europe, and it revealed some appreciation of 
the dangers of active deployment. Nonetheless the partial deactivation of forces, 
which was reciprocated by Gorbachov after the coup attempt had failed, did not 
alter the basic character or destructive potential of deterrent operations. It may 
have mitigated the risk of inadvertent catastrophe but did not eliminate it.  
The issues of internal control were also recognized as the Russian Federation 
emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but again they were 
                                           
16 Alexander Lukin, “From a Post-Soviet to a Russian Foreign Policy,” Russia in Global Affairs, 
No. 4, October – December 2008. 
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subordinated to the main thrust of American policy. The United States provided 
financial and material assistance to Russia for the deactivation of some of its 
inherited nuclear weapons, but did not relieve the underlying preemptive threat 
posed to their active forces. Quite the contrary, it relentlessly enhanced that threat 
in Russian estimation through the process of NATO expansion which extended its 
area of operational jurisdiction up to the Russian border and provided formal 
assurances of protection to countries that have historically been antagonistic to 
Russia. That context not only marginalized but counteracted the U.S. contribution 
to the strengthening of internal control over Russia’s inherited forces -- arguably 
its own most compelling interest.  Moreover, it completely preempted any question 
of broader security assistance, a basic requirement of fundamental accommodation.   
That history is now part of Russia’s formative experience and will certainly make 
accommodation more difficult to achieve than it would originally have been. The 
background incentives still make it presumptively feasible nonetheless despite 
accumulated grievances and residual distrust. The United States is in position to 
assure Russia’s legitimate security requirements at a much higher standard of 
protection and efficiency than Russia alone could achieve. A serious commitment 
to do so on equitable terms would be difficult to resist.   
Admittedly a security relationship is a diffuse notion involving social attitudes and 
broad public impressions as well as official policies, formal agreements, military 
deployment patterns and operational practices. It is generally considered to be the 
consequence of circumstance, perceived interest and substantive policies rather 
than the direct focus of policy itself. And indeed if active confrontation is the 
fundamental operating principle, then the state of a security relationship is 
primarily determined by relative operational capability and by a categorical 
presumption of potential conflict. Apart from a few crisis episodes, even the Cold 
War opponents did not generally proclaim hostility and did express the desire for 
accommodation as they engaged in active confrontation. The disposition of forces 
was nonetheless understood to be the real measure of the relationship.  
If reassurance is to become the dominant principle, however, then the unavoidable 
disparity in military capability that currently prevails cannot be the central measure 
of merit or the principle determinant of the U.S.- Russian security relationship. A 
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mutual understanding of purpose and intention would have to be developed that is 
robust enough to override traditional contingency planning principles. Those 
principles require a military establishment to prepare a defense against any threat a 
potential enemy is capable of undertaking regardless of its estimated inclination to 
do so.  Russia inherited that planning standard from the Soviet Union but cannot 
reasonably meet its requirements in confrontation with the United States. In order 
to establish an understanding considered reliable enough to be an alternative basis 
for security, the relationship itself would have to be the principal focus of attention. 
Since the determinants of a security relationship are diffuse, so also are the 
opportunities for shaping it, and a successful process would probably involve some 
creativity that is difficult to anticipate. The central features of a serious effort are 
nonetheless evident.  
 As the stronger party and recently the more aggressive one, the United States 
would have to initiate the process by conveying at the outset a credible 
intention to accomplish fundamental security accommodation. That would 
have to be presented as a basic change of policy and would have to be 
documented by suspending both the further expansion of NATO and 
implementation of the agreement to deploy ballistic missile defense 
technology in central Europe pending a mutually acceptable understanding 
with Russia. A declaration of intent would probably also have to be 
supported by agreement in principle to open negotiations on legally binding 
regulatory rules of mutual interest.  
 Both countries would have to endorse the principle that no offensive 
operation be undertaken without international authorization. Especially at 
the outset, before acceptable specification is worked out, that might require 
some qualification to the effect that a good faith effort to secure 
authorization would be undertaken under all circumstances and that any 
exception would be based on credible determination of imminent threat.  
 Both countries would have to commit themselves in principle to the 




 Both countries would have to commit themselves in principle to the joint 
conduct of protective operational missions; most notably, military air traffic 
control, ballistic missile tracking and space surveillance.  
The central purpose of those provisions is to regulate the threat of preemptive 
attack. If nuclear forces are not immediately available, if their return to active 
status could be reliably detected and if air and space surveillance of conventional 
forces operations were joint operations, then the critical element of surprise would 
be precluded and reassurance would be conveyed on a continuous basis. The 
mobilization of an imminent threat would still be possible but the requirement for 
international authorization and the assurance of timely warning would make the 
potential less immediately imposing. That would affect expectation more than 
capability, but with an equitable balance of capability essentially infeasible 
anytime soon the management of expectations is the essence of the matter. The 
members of NATO have considerable offensive potential against each other, but 
their separate national operations are sufficiently well integrated that they do not 
consider that fact to be relevant. Given their historical antagonisms and some 
smoldering contemporary ones, that is a very significant accomplishment – an 
obvious model for the world as a whole.   
The extension of those provisions to Russia and ultimately to China as well would 
be a radical change of operational policy requiring very extensive negotiations to 
specify and lengthy time to implement. Even the initial thought would undoubtedly 
inspire howling protest and categorical rejection from the defenders of 
institutionalized practice on both sides. Again the question is whether the 
respective political systems are able to discern and develop their underlying 
interest in provisions of this sort.  
The primary interest in question is the risk of massive catastrophe inherent in the 
operational coupling of the deterrent forces. As noted, that is by far the greatest 
source of physical danger to both societies that cannot be justified by any credible 
deterrent requirement. A comprehensive conception of risk would have to 
acknowledge the irreducible danger and would have to concede that the 
continuously increasing pressure imposed on the Russian command system by the 
United States investment program and the preemptive doctrine increases the risk 
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by an amount that cannot be accurately measured. Standard rules of prudence of 
the sort applied in other areas – the licensing of nuclear reactors, for example – 
would impose the burden of proof on those who declare the risk to be negligible, 
and they could not meet that burden. The practical fact that the burden currently 
goes the other way is an unmistakable sign of pathology in the political process. If 
the United States and Russia are to eliminate the threat of catastrophe before 
experiencing it, they will have to terminate active deterrent force operations and 
will have to do so in direct collaboration.   
And that is not the only strong interest in question.  With the global financial crisis 
demonstrating the entanglement of national economies, security accommodation is 
becoming an increasingly important condition for vital economic cooperation. 
Russia’s fate is tied to the market, and that fact sharply constrains any adventures 
in coercive intimidation it might be tempted to undertake. Those in Russia who 
have imagined that wealth extracted from international energy and primary 
commodity markets enables a reversion to Soviet era behavior and those in the 
United States who have imagined that development as well are neglecting the 
imperatives of economic performance in a global market. Since Russia is heavily 
dependent on energy exports, it must maintain its reputation as a reliable supplier 
and could not tolerate the economic isolation that a significant imperial adventure 
might trigger. Russia has too small an economy to be a major factor in the global 
economy on grounds of scale, but its energy resources and technical capacity 
confer consequence as does its potential for internal disintegration.  An effective 
response to global warming would have to include Russia as an integral partner. 
Serious engagement is warranted from both national perspectives quite apart from 
the question of immediate physical danger.  
As a practical matter, the Russian military action against Georgia in August of 
2008 will undoubtedly be an enduring political impediment to accommodation. 
From the U.S. perspective, it readily evokes traditional images of imperial 
aggression and appears to justify the underlying policy of deterrent confrontation. 
From a Russian perspective, it was a legitimate reaction to provocation initiated by 
Georgia and encouraged by NATO. Were there a truly fair court to judge such 
things, available details suggest that Russia would have a strong case short of 
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completely compelling. Underlying resentment and nostalgia for great power status 
appear to have played some role in their failure to invite international mediation 
and in their aggressive reaction to perceived provocation. But whatever the 
appropriate allocation of blame, the event was not significant enough to override 
the reasons for accommodation. Apart from its nuclear arsenal, Russia’s capacity 
for offensive operations outside its own territory is restricted to a few border areas 
against modest opposition.  It simply does not have the military establishment, the 
economic base or the fundamental incentive to indulge in global or even regional 
power projection. Its aggressive behavior is far more plausibly seen as a response 
to perceived threat than as a manifestation of imperial zeal. Political emotion aside, 
reassurance is a far more appropriate response than countervailing threat, which 
will be available at any rate.  
 
China 
China’s relevant formative experience has sufficiently different character that it is 
more difficult to comprehend from an external perspective, perhaps even from an 
internal one as well. As compared to the United States and Russia, civil war is a 
more recent experience for China, and its military establishment has had a greater 
role in establishing and preserving the authority of the state. External confrontation 
has also been less prominent. In political terms China was a major participant in 
the Cold War and was an active combatant in the Korean War but did not engage 
thereafter in the global confrontation of forces focused on Central Europe or in a 
regional equivalent. In general, China’s security policy has been subordinated to 
priorities of internal economic development, and it has not made the broad 
investment in external power projection that would be expected of an aspiring 
imperial power.  Instead, China’s leaders originally advanced the phrase “peaceful 
rise” as the summary formulation of their global aspiration and then revised it to 
the yet more circumspect “peaceful development.”  
More specifically, however, China has been intensely committed to defending its 
claim to sovereign authority over Taiwan -- one of the world’s most prominent 
unresolved issues of territorial jurisdiction – and has repeatedly warned it would 
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initiate the use of force to defend that claim if compelled to do so by a unilateral 
declaration of independence. Harmonizing that specific commitment with the 
global formulation while attempting to meet its operational requirements has been 
the dominant problem of China’s security policy.  
China’s deployment of nuclear weapons has been consistent with the global 
formulation. China was the last of the five states to test and deploy nuclear 
weapons before the 1967 cutoff date of the NPT, and during the ensuing decades it 
has not attempted to match the operational capability of the other four despite what 
would appear to be justifying fears. At the time of its initial deployment China 
believed it faced a threat of war both from United States forces fighting in Vietnam 
and from Soviet forces arrayed along its Northern border, with the latter considered 
to be more immediate and more serious problem. In 1969, Chinese and Soviet 
forces fought regiment sized battles over disputed islands in the Ussuri river; and 
the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong, extrapolating from the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia the previous year, suspected those border clashes to be the 
precursor of a massive assault. 17  The collective apprehension of the Chinese 
leadership resulted in an alert of the nuclear armed missile forces China then had 
available, apparently without the knowledge or explicit authorization of Mao or 
even his chief military commander and political rival, Lin Bao in whose name the 
alert order was issued.18 When Mao himself and his ultimate successor, Deng 
Xioping, realized the compromise of political control that had occurred and came 
to appreciate the vulnerability to preemption the alert order had created, they 
evidently determined that China’s nuclear forces would henceforth operate under 
reliable subordination and would not risk the dangers of operational engagement. 
At any rate, since that episode China has maintained the smallest of the official 
nuclear forces, and as best can be judged from remote observation none of its 
weapons is ever brought to an operational state from which it could immediately be 
launched. Moreover, alone among the nuclear weapons states, China has 
repeatedly issued a categorical declaration that it would not initiate the use of 
                                           
17 John Lewis and Xue Litai, Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War, Stanford 
University Press 2006, Chapter 3. 
18 Ibid. p. 65 ff.  
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nuclear weapons or threaten to do so “at any time under any circumstance.”  
China’s deployment pattern is by far the most restricted of the officially sanctioned 
nuclear weapons states, particularly in comparison to the United States and Russia.   
Over the nearly four decades during which its minimal nuclear weapons posture 
has been maintained, China has made a sustained diplomatic effort to resolve its 
peripheral border disputes by compromise agreements and has succeeded in 15 of 
the 17 instances, including an agreement with Russia in 2004 to divide control of 
two of the river islands that had been the focus of the 1969 confrontation with the 
Soviet Union.19 That effort, which has the effect of disengaging all military forces 
from potential triggers of conflict, is a natural complement to the restrained nuclear 
weapons deployment policy, and it reinforces the global formulation of peaceful 
development.  
Again, however, Taiwan is a stark exception.  China’s categorical refusal to 
consider any compromise of its de jure claim to Taiwan despite not having de facto  
control puts an implicit burden on its military establishment that is difficult to 
reconcile with its main line of policy. China would have to initiate military action 
to reverse a declaration of independence, and it could not rely on its nuclear forces 
even for background deterrent protection.  The advanced reconnaissance and 
navigation capabilities of American forces put those forces in considerable 
jeopardy. As a practical matter, it would be yet more dangerous for China to 
activate its nuclear forces in a contemporary confrontation with the United States 
than it was in the 1969 confrontation with the Soviet Union. The United States 
could credibly threaten a preemptive attack with conventional weapons alone and 
                                           
19 M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s 
Compromises in Territorial Disputes”, International Security, vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005, pp. 46 – 
83. Fravel argues that the effort has been primarily motivated by fear of insurgency among ethnic 
minorities in the border areas and that explanation fits the espoused objective of Chinese security 
policy to preserve internal coherence. Fravel acknowledges, however, that the Ussuri river 
disputes had no direct connection to internal dissention and even for those that did the desire to 
prevent active confrontation is a plausible contributing motive.   
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might command global justification in doing so if China were perceived to be the 
aggressor in the immediate situation. 
Although the internal deliberations of China’s leadership are effectively protected 
from external scrutiny, judging from their investment priorities they appear to have 
concluded that defense of their legal claim to Taiwan will primarily depend on 
conventional missile and tactical air capabilities. China has deployed more than 
1,000 conventional missiles in range of Taiwan, and at a moment of tension in 
1995, it bracketed the island with tests of those missiles.20 The point effectively 
made on that occasion was that military tension would disrupt the trade and 
investment markets on which Taiwan depends. That effect would be compounded 
by physical damage if the missiles were actually used against port facilities and 
other infrastructure assets, but it would not confer control over the island.  The 
ability to sustain that disruptive threat would depend, moreover, on the ability to 
defend the missile installations and China’s own infrastructure assets against 
counterattack, especially from United States tactical air forces.   
In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, in which the United States first 
demonstrated its advanced capabilities, China increased its own military 
investment focusing on an array of measures evidently designed to cope with 
potential U.S. tactical air engagement in a Taiwan crisis. Measured against their 
historical base, the effort has been substantial, involving double-digit percentage 
increases in the estimated defense budget over the past decade. The historical rate 
was so low, however, that the enhanced rate of expenditure is still only about 10% 
of the U.S. annual defense budget. Moreover, technical and operational mastery of 
military missions is a process of sequential learning determined as much or more 
by organizational adaptation to combat experience as by rates of expenditure. 
Assuming that China is able to do a realistic assessment, they would have to be 
pessimistic about their ability to prevail in a military confrontation over Taiwan 
occurring any time soon.  
                                           
20 Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2007). 
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Fortunately the probability of such a confrontation has substantially receded with 
the victory of the Kuomintang party in Taiwan’s parliamentary elections in January 
of  2008 and with the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou as President in March. 
Combined with the results of two relevant referenda, the transfer of power 
essentially eliminated the immediate possibility that Taiwan would attempt formal 
independence, as Ma’s predecessor, Chen Shui-bian, had threatened. President 
Ma’s formula for cross-strait relations – “no independence, no unification, no 
fighting” – is acceptable to the PRC, and direct constructive contact has 
significantly improved.  The underlying issue is not resolved, however, and the 
dynamics of politics on Taiwan could return it to an acute phase. Although the 
DPP leader, Chen Shui-bian, mishandled the independence question, the idea does 
enjoy popular support on the island, and at some point it could find legitimate 
expression that would be awkward to frustrate. Security reassurance for China will 
continue to revolve around the Taiwan situation.  
China’s major historical grievance in that regard has to do with United States arms 
sales to the Taiwan government.  In a joint communiqué issued by the U.S. and 
PRC governments on August 17, 1982 – the third of the three foundation 
documents establishing the basis for normalization – the US stated that it: 
“…does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, 
that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, 
and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan…” 
China considers this commitment to have been systematically violated, and in fact 
from 1982 through 2002 the total value of U.S. government arms deliveries to 
Taiwan exceeded $17 billion, with an additional $2 billion in commercial sales.21 
In October of 2008, the Bush administration announced a new arms sales package 
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of $6.5 billion. The United States has typically justified the sales by claiming the 
weapons and equipment provided are defensive in character as mandated under the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, enacted prior to the joint communiqué. For many of 
the armaments sold, however – especially F-16 tactical aircraft – the distinction 
between offensive and defensive capability is hardly categorical, and at any rate 
the 1982 joint communiqué makes no mention of the distinction. Much of the 
impulse for the sales has come from domestic American constituencies with 
extraneous interests in mind; but, however much China may discount for that 
effect, the arms sales record remains a fundamental issue of reliability. An effort to 
establish security accommodation would have to address it.  
Despite that irritant, however, as compared with Russia, China and the United 
States have a far more developed economic relationship to set an enabling context 
for security accommodation. China’s sustained rate of rapid economic growth, 
which the political leadership considers vital to the preservation of internal 
coherence, has been driven in significant part by the manufacture of products for 
the American consumer market.  China has invested a major portion of its resulting 
trade surpluses in the United States, in effect balancing its abnormally high 
domestic savings rate against the abnormally low American savings rate. Annual 
trade between the two countries was $ 385 billion in 2007, and the United States 
made $75 billion in direct foreign investment in that year. As of the end of 2006, 
China had accumulated over $1 trillion in currency reserves about $400 billion of 
which were invested in U.S. treasury bonds.22 Those numbers indicate that the 
economies have become so intertwined that it is reasonable to speak of a symbiotic 
relationship despite their different operating rules.  
Recognizing their degree of entanglement, in 2006 the two governments initiated a 
strategic dialogue between their top economic officials to discuss the coordination 
and harmonization of their respective policies.23 The differences between the two 
economic systems present many contentious issues, the most prominent of which 
                                           
22 U.S. – China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, The U.S. – China Business 
Council (available at: http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html). 
23 Henry M. Paulson, Jr., “A Strategic Economic Engagement: Strengthening U.S. - China Ties,” 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, No. 5, September/October 2008, pp. 59 – 77.  
48 
 
are the subject of formal trade negotiations, but the organization of a dialogue and 
the commitment of time at the head-of-state and cabinet level reflect an 
appreciation of underlying common interest. Negotiations are typically organized 
to work out compromise between competing interests. Dialogue connotes shared 
interest.   
The relationship between economic and security interest is one of the more 
important conceptual issues presented by the process of globalization, and the 
particular relationship between the United States and China is arguably the most 
significant instance. As noted, the traditional “realists” that have dominated 
American security policy assert the inherent priority and immutable conflict of 
security interests on the basis of their interpretation of historical experience. In 
setting internal economic development as the explicit priority of its security policy 
and in projecting the formula of peaceful rise, China’s leaders have advanced a 
different conception that appears to allow and even require fundamental security 
accommodation. Again the basic question is whether the United States will prove 
to be willing and capable of responding to that conception and developing its 
implications.   
As in the case of Russia, the initiative for accommodation would have to come 
from the United States as the inherently stronger party – a natural principle of 
etiquette that the American political process has yet to recognize or master. It 
would also have to involve an explicit reformulation of policy replacing the 
preemptive doctrine. In the context of the Taiwan situation, that doctrine is yet 
more threatening to China than it is to Russia. For that reason, a commitment by 
the United States not to initiate the use of force without international authorization 
is likely to be the central provision of accommodation from China’s perspective, 
but because of the reciprocal implication of that principle it would have to be 
accompanied by reassurance that China itself would not be put in the position of 
having to initiate force to defend its claim to Taiwan. In all three of the basic 
normalization documents, the United States explicitly committed itself to the 
principle that “there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China,” and it has 
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officially adhered to that principle ever since.24 In China’s estimation, however, the 
U.S. security relationship with Taiwan has not been harmonized with that 
principle, and it is doubtful that any general reformulation or elaboration of policy 
will accomplish that. Adequate reassurance is likely to require a continuously 
active security dialogue among all three of the engaged governments and 
collaborative management of military operations in the strait area. 
In extending a policy of accommodation beyond the priority topic of Taiwan, 
regulation of space activities provides, perhaps, the most significant immediate 
opportunity. China has led the international effort to initiate negotiations that the 
United States has been resisting. China has also demonstrated its capability to 
attack satellites as an implicit warning. The destruction of hostile space assets 
would be a logical means for China to counteract a preemptive threat from the 
United States that is not credibly restrained. Negotiating a rule against interference 
with space assets would reinforce the accommodating element of China’s space 
policy and contain the confrontational element that more recently appeared. As 
noted, explicit legal protection is the fundamental long-term interest of the United 
States as well. 
But fundamental security accommodation with China would eventually have to 
extend to its global security posture as well. The process of terminating active 
deterrent force operations and of providing for accurate accounting of explosive 
isotope inventories would have to include China in its advanced stages and that 
means that China would have to be consulted at the outset. That process would not 
involve the radical transformation of Chinese nuclear weapons operations that it 
would for the United States and Russia, but China would eventually have to adopt 
the disclosure rules and monitoring arrangements necessary to document 
compliance with comprehensive deactivation. Transparency is a very sensitive 
matter for China, and some participation in the design and initial implementation 
of global arrangements is likely to be necessary for their eventual participation. 
                                           
24 “The Joint U.S. - China Communiqué,” Shanghai, February 27, 1972; “Joint Communiqué on 
the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the 
People’s Republic of China,” January 1, 1979; “U.S. PRC Joint Communiqué,” August 17, 1982.   
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Along the way, China would undoubtedly be interested in global rules for the 
deployment of ballistic missile defenses as well. Again assuming China’s ability to 
do accurate technical assessment, their concerns in that regard are likely to be 
related to the preemption doctrine. Their technical experts can readily discern that 
ballistic missile defenses have no significant prospect for performing stand alone 
missions against a competent nuclear deterrent force, but there is some potential 
for providing a meaningful supplement to preemptive attack plans. Given China’s 
essentially unique commitment to a strict policy of retaliation, that is a natural 
concern.  
For the United States, the problem of global warming provides the primary 
motivating interest for security accommodation with China. There is little hope of 
mastering the problem unless China is diverted from its current trajectory of 
reliance on coal as an energy generating source, and that almost certainly will 
require extensive development of nuclear power generation. China’s recently 
announced plans for a major expansion of nuclear power are doubtfully realistic 
and at any rate would not be adequate. Again expansion on the scale required could 
only be accomplished on the basis of reactor designs not yet available and would 
require global technical and financial engagement on a scale and at a level of detail 
that current security policies, based on a presumption of potential hostility, would 
not permit. But there are more immediate incentives as well. In particular the 
United States has a strong interest in not driving China’s nuclear forces into active 
alert operations. That would compound the misconception of risk and the resulting 
underlying danger that is currently confined to interactions with the Russian 
deterrent force.  
 
Iran 
The relationship between the United States and Iran is burdened by a legacy of 
unresolved antagonism arguably more intractable than any of the more mainstream 
Cold War residues. The United States was directly implicated in the overthrow of 
the democratically elected political leader, Mohammed Mossadeq, in 1953 and in 
the subsequent, highly repressive rule of the Shah – a sustained intervention in 
51 
 
Iran’s domestic politics undertaken with global confrontation primarily in mind. 
The Islamic revolution that overthrew the Shah in 1979 was explicitly directed 
against the United States as well, and the seizure of American diplomats that 
followed shortly thereafter was as much a countervailing intervention in United 
States domestic politics as Iran was capable of undertaking. There have been no 
diplomatic relations since that episode, and many informal efforts to initiate 
reconciliation have been officially spurned by one side or the other.  
From a detached perspective, there is plenty of blame to be shared, but in recent 
years the United States has been the more intransigent. In the aftermath of the 
invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to remove the Taliban regime, Iran joined an 
international conference in Bonn to reconstitute the government and was publicly 
praised by the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan as being especially helpful. 
Despite that effort, the axis of evil allegation was made barely a month later in 
President Bush’s State of the Union Address. Then in 2003, as Iran suspended its 
uranium enrichment program and admitted past violation of IAEA disclosure rules, 
it made an overture to the United States for direct discussion of the full range of 
outstanding issues. That overture was rejected, and Libya was subsequently 
advanced as the standard against which Iran should be judged – essentially a model 
of nearly complete acceptance of American policy demands implicitly but only 
implicitly in exchange for acceptance of the Libyan political regime.25 And then 
again in the spring of 2007, Iran reportedly made an overture to discuss the 
impasse over the enrichment program with the same result – a demand to suspend 
the program and resolve outstanding issues of IAEA inspection before any 
discussion of normalized relations could be held.  
The Obama administration initially extended its general principle of engagement to 
Iran but the process has broken down in mutual recrimination. In October of 2009 
negotiations through the IAEA in Vienna formulated a deal whereby Iran would 
export a portion of its low enriched uranium stock in exchange for fabricated fuel 
                                           
25 Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy 
Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security, vol. 30, No. 3, 
Winter 2005/2006, pp. 47 – 86.  
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for a research reactor in Teheran that produces medical isotopes. By reducing the 
LEU stock under direct Iranian control, such an arrangement would extend the 
time required to produce the amount of HEU required for a nuclear weapon. The 
Iranian leadership subsequently insisted either that the reactor fuel be delivered at 
the same time the LEU was exported or there be some escrow provision or contract 
guarantee if the LEU was exported, as the United States insisted, a year or more 
before the reactor fuel would be delivered. The United States rejected both 
conditions. In the Spring of 2010 the sequence was repeated when a variant of the 
arrangement was negotiated in Teheran by Turkey and Brazil following what they 
had taken to be a letter of endorsement written to the President of Brazil by 
President Obama himself only to have the United States again reject the terms.  
Whatever the underlying bargaining calculation might be, it is quite unlikely that 
the United States can exercise sufficient coercive pressure to force Iranian 
capitulation, and an overly menacing effort to do so might readily backfire. The 
critical battle is over justification and the only legitimate outcome is evident. Iran 
can reasonably be asked to submit its uranium enrichment and plutonium 
production activities to reliable inspection and to put the product under 
international control as the initial stage of fuel management arrangement that 
would ultimately apply to all countries. It can reasonably demand in exchange 
internationally ratified assurances that it will not be attacked if it does not itself 
initiate attack and that it will have equitable access to nuclear fuel cycle services. 
But a full agenda for accommodation would have to include matters that extend 
beyond the bilateral relationship between Iran and the United States and are not 
under the realistic control of either government; most notably, insurgency in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and security relationships in 
the Persian Gulf region. That means that accommodation would have to be a 
staged process not entirely dependent on settled outcomes and correspondingly 
more difficult to manage.  
Thirty years of mutual antagonism have definitely limited the scope of what even 
the most constructively inclined in both societies are currently willing to imagine. 
Accommodation between the United States and Iran has to labor against unusually 
strong resistance, but it cannot be responsibly declared infeasible in the name of 
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“realism.”  Accommodation is in fact powerfully propelled by underlying interest 
in the context of globalization. If it loses the battle of legitimacy over its nuclear 
materials program, Iran cannot afford the economic isolation and direct physical 
damage the United States is capable of imposing. In order to win the battle of 
legitimacy and therefore wield decisive leverage, the United States must credibly 
convey tolerance of Iran’s political regime, in effect abandoning the recently 
declared project of imposing its form of democracy by force. Those are the larger 
dictates of realism, and they present a test of competence for both political 
systems.  
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSPARENCY   
The central problem in transforming historically antagonistic security relationships 
and in establishing mutual reassurance as the primary operating principle is that of 
dealing with irreducible forms of intrinsic hostility – that is, the impulse for 
violence not generated or justified as a response to direct threat. For large-scale 
aggression that is not an intractable problem. The norm against imperial intrusion 
is sufficiently strong and the effort required to seize control of defended territory 
sufficiently demanding that vigilance and preparations for contingent reaction can 
reasonably expect to succeed. Current news flows and national intelligence 
capabilities already make it quite difficult to prepare a major combined arms 
assault without being detected and even more difficult to execute it if the United 
States chooses to contest the matter. With some dedicated effort to extend the 
deployment restrictions and military exercise reporting requirements developed in 
Europe, that de facto situation could evolve into a global arrangement.  
As the operational scale of potential violence decreases, however, the burden of 
vigilance and contingent reaction increases. At some point on that scale, the 
character of the problem shifts from defending territory to defending legal order, 
and the scope of reasonable expectation shifts as well. The instruments of violence 
are so ubiquitously available and the impulse to indulge in it so deeply rooted that 
severe disruption cannot be entirely prevented even if classic imperial aggression 
can be.  
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In principle, interstate antagonisms can be pursued at the lesser scales of violence, 
and that is occurring to some extent in South Asia and the Middle East regions. 
That has not been the recent historical tradition of the non-contiguous major 
powers, however. The Soviet Union and the United States did indulge in proxy 
battles throughout the developing world but did not attempt to engage in terrorist 
violence directed against the opposing society. They were not intrinsically hostile 
to each other to that extent. The more reasonable judgment is that equitable 
accommodation is now both the dominant interest and the principal inclination of 
the major societies entangled in the process of globalization and that intrinsic 
hostility is largely confined to sub-state organizations in the context of unresolved 
territorial disputes.  To the extent that judgment is correct, it supports the basic 
idea of accommodation and identifies an additional incentive to pursue it; namely 
protection against a common threat of violent disruption.  
Fortuitously, the principal method of mutual reassurance—organized transparency 
– applies across the entire spectrum of violence. Disclosure rules and active 
monitoring arrangements provide the means of reassuring Russia, China and 
ultimately Iran that the United States capacity for preemption will not be directed 
against them as long as they themselves adhere to agreed rules. Disclosure is also 
the basic method for counting and securing nuclear explosive inventories, for 
controlling the use of all other potentially destructive technologies and generally 
for constraining the scope of destructive violence. Timely revelation of developing 
threat is the key to effective prevention, and there is enormous potential for forced 
disclosure and protective monitoring techniques to assure timely revelation well 
into the spectrum of disruption. The technical capacity to acquire, store and 
process detailed information has developed to the point that systematic application 
of those techniques could dramatically reduce the scope for violence and for many 
forms of criminal activity as well by tracking critical commodities, financial 
transactions and personal activities, provided that the global community could 
agree to rules making them continuously observable. The central question is the 
degree of intrusiveness to be tolerated in the name of protection.  
That question engages core human values and does not admit to any consensus 
answer, but the threat of severe disruption does appear to be serious enough to 
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compel some development of protective monitoring techniques as a major, perhaps 
even dominant method of security. That in turn would require a fundamental 
reassessment of traditional intelligence services. Those services have historically 
relied primarily on methods of secret observation and illegal penetration that lock 
the respective national agencies providing them into intrinsically hostile 
relationships with each other, despite some experience with expedient 
collaboration.  For the United States, at least, those traditional methods have 
enabled its intelligence community to perform their main mission with high 
confidence – that is, warning of large-scale surprise attack timely and definitive 
enough to support preventive action. But none of the others could be as confident 
of their ability to detect a surprise attack the United States might initiate, and even 
the United States loses its confidence against lesser forms of threat, as the events of 
9/11 illustrated.  No extension or elaboration of traditional intelligence methods 
can reasonably expect to provide assured warning of small-scale clandestine 
threats under current rules for operating the global economy. In order to 
accomplish higher resolution warning with confidence, mandatory transparency 
measures would have to be systematically imposed, and detailed monitoring 
information would have to be exchanged by legal agreement. Given their history of 
intrinsic hostility, the existing intelligence agencies are very unlikely to be trusted 
with managing protective monitoring information of that sort.  
There are a number of international agencies currently engaged in gathering and 
managing protective monitoring information, most notably the IAEA and the 
WHO. But all of these agencies operate as supplements to national intelligence 
services – or public health services in the case of WHO – and none of them have 
the degree of detail or comprehensiveness required for protection against small 
scale but highly disruptive threats. Systematic development of protective 
monitoring as a central method of global security would require much more 
advanced arrangements, in all probability entirely new institutions specifically 
designed to assure responsible custody. At the extreme, for example, if details of 
expenditure, commodity use, travel and communication were to be tracked down to 
the individual level, procedures for managing the resulting data base would have to 
be very robust indeed. In order to prevent misuse of the information, rules of 
legitimate access and use would have to be defined and enforced to a high standard 
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of fidelity. Even so, no single institution is likely to be given comprehensive 
jurisdiction.  
It is not evident that appropriate institutions could be created or that the threat of 
violent disruption is actually severe enough to warrant them. But it is evident that 
those questions will have to be considered. One clear implication of the financial 
crisis is that global prosperity depends on effective regulation not yet assured. As 
the implications are pursued and global dynamics are better understood, it is 
reasonable to expect that the traditionally separate topics of security and economic 
management are likely to blend together. Violence appears to be both a cause and a 
result of economic austerity. The coherence of human societies appears to depend 
on preserving some standard of equity. If the capacity for destruction is to be 
contained, the full spectrum of threat will have to be addressed in a plausibly 
integrated fashion. Imperial aggression blends into civil violence, terrorism, 
criminal assault and corruption. There is no guarantee that governing institutions 
can successfully adapt to the burdens being imposed, but there will surely have to 
be serious effort to do so. For the United States especially, that will require 
revision of policies, operating principles and underlying attitudes well beyond 
anything yet visible in the political process. Having advanced the basic idea of 
fundamental change, we need now to contend with what it really means.  
 
